Introduction
This paper attempts to empower consumers, regulators, and businesses by providing information about the relative risk of identity theft 2 at major financial institutions. Many individuals commented on the first version of this paper, 3 including one who criticized the effort, using a comparison from the auto industry:
This is like grading Chevrolet on its corporate ability to avoid having its cars wreck. Sure, they'd prefer that their vehicles would never be involved in an accident, but since they aren't driving their cars (once sold) much less the other vehicles which may be involved in the accident, it's very tough for them to improve "their accident" statistics.
This is an excellent comparison, but for different reasons than the commenter intended. Let me explain: Of course automobile manufacturers cannot control how people drive, but over the past 50 years, a market for auto safety has emerged, and the rate of traffic fatalities has decreased dramatically. 4 Understanding the factors that fostered an auto safety market, and a decrease in driving fatalities is worthwhile, because it illuminates the goals of Measuring Identity Theft at Top Banks. First, we must explore the commenter's metaphor in greater depth.
The commenter's metaphor expressed a frequent objection to the first version of this paper. Other commenters more explicitly stated that consumers are to blame for many identity theft incidents, because they fall for phishing attacks, they fail to secure personal information, or they allow family members or friends to steal their identity. But, 2 "Identity theft" describes the use of another individual's personal information for fraudulent purposes. Attacks, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 259, 260 (2005) . The most important distinction among types of identity theft are: "account takeover," where an impostor uses an established account, such as a credit card issued to a victim; and "new account fraud," where an impostor opens lines of credit in the victim's name. Returning to the commenter's metaphor--if automobile safety were treated as an impossible challenge because of driver error, could progress be made in reducing traffic fatalities?
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When automobile safety came to the attention of Congress and reformers in the 1960s, automakers highlighted the role of driver behavior and the relatively low rates of equipment failure in accident causation. 5 General Motors spent less than 1% of its budget relative to profits on safety. 6 Because drivers caused most accidents, automakers reasoned, driver education, rather than safety or design mandates, was the best solution to address harm. 7 Today, driver error continues to cause most crashes, but it is understood in more nuanced ways, and technologies are being developed to help drivers avoid mistakes. Many parallels exist between automobile safety, and, for lack of a better term, bank safety-the prevention of a panoply of fraud-related harms, such as identity theft and phishing. Just as consumers lacked safety information on cars in the 1960s, today we lack reliable methods to understand risk of identity theft at banks. Without such tools, a market for bank safety cannot emerge; institutions cannot "race to the top" to shield consumers from fraud.
In earlier work, I have argued that to address these problems, lending institutions should publicly report basic statistical information about identity theft events. 14 In the UK, a basic fraud statistics-reporting network already exists. 15 We could improve upon that system by reporting the number of identity theft events suffered or avoided; the form of identity theft attempted and the product targeted (e.g., mortgage loan or credit card);
and the amount of loss suffered or avoided. With reporting, consumers, regulators, and businesses could more accurately assess the identity theft problem and respond appropriately.
Since identity theft reporting is not on the legislative horizon in the US, this effort seeks to find proxies for reporting by banks. Thus, 
Methods and Challenges in Measuring Identity Theft
This analysis suffers from several methodological challenges, but progress on many of these challenges was made in version 1.5, thanks to the contribution of several commenters. The sections below explain ongoing challenges with the FTC data that identifies institutions, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and other data that is used to compare the size of institutions, and other, general challenges.
The Federal Trade Commission Consumer Complaint Data
The FTC collects information from identity theft victims by phone and through an online form. 16 In doing so, the FTC requests that victims: "Please identify companies or organizations where fraudulent accounts were established or your current accounts were affected…" In the form used to process this data, victims are asked to identify up to three companies where accounts were established or affected. While the FTC performs an annual analysis of this complaint data, the agency does not publicize the names of institutions identified by victims. 17 The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) was used to request this data, along with additional, non-personally identifiable information provided by victims. All the responses from the three company fields were concatenated, and blank rows, extraneous data (obvious errors, such as zip codes), and rows containing content such as "unknown" or "not provided" were eliminated. The data were adjusted where inconsistent or misspelled names were used (e.g., Wallmart, Citybank, Bank of American), combined where companies that, as of 2006, were merged but nevertheless were identified as separate companies by consumers (e.g., AT&T Wireless and Cingular, JP Morgan and Chase), and consolidated when corporate names were merged with a specific product (e.g., "Citibank Visa" became "Citibank").
Institutions were then ranked in order from high to low by number of fraud events. This means that the number of fraud events is counted differently than complaints. In fact, it is common for a single identity theft complaint to describe several events of fraud, and several institutions involved in the fraud. Therefore, for purposes of this analysis, any mention of a company name (each complaint allows victims to enter up to three) is an event that was counted for purpose of calculating the overall number and relative rate of identity theft.
This analysis could benefit from the inclusion of more data, especially data indicating whether the events submitted by victims pertained to account takeovers or new account fraud. A variety of consumer protection laws and self-regulatory practices limit liability for financial account takeovers. 19 However, regulations and self-regulatory practices associated with credit cards are more advantageous to consumers than protections associated with debit/ATM cards. Therefore, an account takeover of a credit card may have less financial impact to a consumer than the takeover of a debit/ATM card. When a non-credit account, such as a checking or savings account, is hijacked, the victim can be left with no money and no ability to pay bills. Broder suggested a second weakness in using the FTC data to rank institutions:
"some companies take special efforts to direct consumers to the FTC's complaint system," accordingly, these institutions "may have a disproportionate number of complaints" in the database. 26 The FTC receives complaint data from the Better Business
Bureau and the Identity Theft Assistance Center (ITAC), the later of which has submitted more than 29,000 complaints to the FTC database. Second, Paul Witman, a professor with California Lutheran University's School of Business, made suggestions for improving the FDIC data used in version 1.0. He suggested using "Number of deposit accounts of $ 100,000 or less," a FDIC statistic that is only offered in reports submitted in June. It is defined as, "Number of deposit accounts of $100,000 or less held in domestic offices."
Third, two additional FDIC measures are incorporated in version 1.5. "Deposit accounts of $100,000 or less," and "Retail deposits" should help focus in on consumercontrolled accounts, and exclude larger, corporate accounts. Deposit accounts of $100,000 or less is defined as "Amount of deposit accounts of $100,000 or less held in domestic offices and in insured branches in Puerto Rico and U.S. territories and possessions." Retail deposits is defined as, "Total domestic office deposits minus time deposits of $100,000 or more held in domestic offices."
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These new FDIC measures should be useful in comparing banks with strong consumer deposit bases, but institutions with large credit card operations will fare worse under this measure.
Other Methods Challenges
In addition to the challenges presented by the FTC, FDIC and Nilson data, several other problems remain unresolved:
Telecommunications companies ranked highly in overall events, but their relative rates of fraud are not compared here. Jesper Johansson suggested several sources for obtaining data on wireless subscribers, most of which are self-reported by telecommunications companies. I prefer to use statistics reported to a government entity where possible, but will incorporate self-reported or proprietary data if officially reported statistics are not available. As a result, no analysis of relative incidence is performed between carriers and banks, or among carriers themselves in this version.
Jesper Johansson provided an in-depth critique of version 1.0, with many helpful suggestions for new metrics to understand the identity theft problem: 
Results and Discussion

Top 25 Institutions by Number of Fraud Events
Bank of America ranks highest in total number of events. Given that this institution is the largest among US banks for deposits, and the resulting concentration of attacks against it by impostors, it is not surprising that it ranks so highly in overall events.
Bank of America was followed by two telecommunications carriers, AT&T and Sprint/Nextel. Other major telecommunications carriers were present in the top fifteen when ranked by total number of events. While this analysis focused on financial institutions, in processing the data, it is
clear that a similar analysis should be performed on utility companies. Thousands of victims identified various utilities companies as the institution involved in the fraud.
Generally speaking, there is a lower level of customer authentication in the establishment of utilities service, and impostors may bootstrap these accounts in order to obtain accounts at other organizations.
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Telecommunications companies figured prominently in the overall event count.
Lacking a meaningful metric to assess the size of these institutions, it is impossible to compare telecommunications companies to each other or to financial institutions. 
Conclusion
This paper began with a metaphor concerning the revolution in automobile safety experienced over the last 50 years. At the beginning of the 1960s automobile safety debate, a blame the driver mentality stood in the way of a nuanced understanding of the problem, and consumers lacked reliable measures for comparing cars on safety. We are in similar posture today with respect to identity theft. Identity theft is a problem, like automobile accidents, that will never be completely solved. Individuals, inexperienced as they are with technology and new methods of payment, will undoubtedly continue to contribute to the problem. If we are to develop a consumer market for bank safety comparable to automobile safety, we need to acknowledge these problems and find ways to foster vigorous competition among institutions for prevention of identity theft. This This is an ongoing, imperfect attempt to quantify risk of identity theft among institutions. Several methodological challenges are explained in the methods section, but the most obvious improvement upon this effort would be institution of voluntary, public reporting by institutions themselves on identity theft. The author welcomes constructive criticism, suggestions, and comments in an effort to create a more perfect picture of identity theft.
